(The following proceedings were had in open court:)

THE CLERK: Case number 15 C 3717, Ariel Investments v. Ariel Capital Advisors.

MR. WOLEK: Good morning, your Honor. Adam Wolek and Brian Noack on behalf of defendant Ariel Capital Advisors LLC.

MR. GOLLWITZER: Good morning, your Honor. Arthur Gollwitzer and Zach Watters for the plaintiff Ariel Investments.

THE COURT: I've got before me -- what I have before me is the plaintiff's motion -- excuse me, yeah, the plaintiff's motion -- the defendant's motion, rather, that's entitled -- it's got a long title; that's why I want to call it up so I have the right thing. The computer is working slowly.

MR. GOLLWITZER: I think we shortened it in our response brief, your Honor, if you want.

THE COURT: It's the defendant's motion to reconsider the ruling on the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or to amend the order to certify it for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) and to stay proceedings in the case pending the appeal. I had asked the parties to brief a question which was raised in that, and that has to do with whether I ought to have held an evidentiary hearing of some sort before a ruling on the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

So I will say that the Seventh Circuit's case law on this topic, the question of evidentiary hearings, is something short of a hundred percent clear. Although I am not sure that that's all that critical to this motion, the plaintiff cites in their response brief in the scheme of things a pretty gosh darn recent case called Northern Grain Marketing v. Greving, G-r-e-v-i-n-g, 743 F.3d 487, decided in 2014 by the Seventh Circuit.

When it talks about the standard of review over on page 491, it says, The plaintiff -- I am leaving out the cites -- The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction when the defendant challenges it, whereas, here, the district court rules on a defendant's motion to dismiss based on the submission of written materials without holding an evidentiary hearing. The plaintiff need only make out a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction. We resolve factual disputes in the plaintiff's favor in evaluating whether that showing has been made, though, in the present case, the facts material to the personal jurisdiction question are undisputed.

So at various points in that quote, the Court cited Purdue Research Foundation, I am not going to give the name of the defendant because it's hard to pronounce, a case from 2003. And so the way they wrote that in the Northern Green Marketing case, if you look at that last sentence, it assumes

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that there can be factual disputes that can be resolved without an evidentiary hearing, and they're supposed to be resolved in the plaintiff's favor. That's on the one hand. There's a bunch of cases that say that.

On the other hand is a slightly more recent case, which is called -- which is cited by the defendant, Philos, P-h-i-l-o-s, Technologies, Inc., v. Philos & D, the letter D, Inc., 802 F.3d 905 decided this year. And in that case, citing a case that was literally in the same volume of F.3d as the -- I'm sorry, it's a little earlier in F.3d than the Purdue Research Foundation case, namely, Hyatt International Corporation v. TOTO, 302 F.3d 707, a decision from 2002. Court says that if material facts about personal jurisdiction are in dispute, the Court must hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve them. Until that hearing is held, the parties asserting personal jurisdiction may only make out a prima In some circumstances, particularly when the facie case. Court is required to assess credibility, in order to resolve factual disputes, the Court may be required to allow either cross-examination of witnesses or prehearing discovery if a party so requests.

So what's interesting about that is that although the Court talks about an evidentiary hearing in the first part of what I just quoted, in the last part of it, they say that the Court may be required to allow cross-examination of witnesses,

which, you know, by your usual definition of evidentiary hearing comes with the territory, all of which says to me that I am not entirely clear on what the Seventh Circuit means exactly or if they made it clear what they mean when they say "evidentiary hearing."

That aside, to the extent that this is a right somebody has, I guess in this case, the defendant, it's like any other right; it can be waived or forfeited. That's what happened here.

In the plaintiff's response to the motion to dismiss for personal jurisdiction, the defendant -- the plaintiff on page 2 gave the standard. By the way, the defendant's opening brief had not really talked about this particular aspect of it -- in other words, how you resolve disputes -- but the plaintiff on page 2 said, When a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is decided on affidavits and other documents, the plaintiff may only make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction to defeat the motion. The Court must accept as true all well pleaded facts alleged in the complaint and resolve any factual disputes in the affidavits in favor of the plaintiff. It cites other cases, but it's essentially what was said in this Northern Grain case.

MR. WOLEK: Your Honor --

THE COURT: In the reply brief -- I am ruling, so just keep it to yourself.

In the reply brief, the defendant did not take issue with that standard and did not request an evidentiary hearing, although, if you believe what the defendant is saying now, there were factual disputes all over the place. The current request for an evidentiary hearing has been forfeited or waived, whichever term you prefer.

Even if that were not the case, I agree with the plaintiff that the determinations on which I base the finding of personal jurisdiction were inferences from the facts, not facts themselves, and it's not clear to me, and I don't think that in that situation that an evidentiary hearing is required anyway, so I don't think that I needed to hold an evidentiary hearing.

The two other issues that were raised, one is essentially a reargument of the merits that the conduct, as I determined it, wasn't sufficient to give rise to personal jurisdiction. I disagree with that for the reasons that I said before. And the other one is that somehow there's a notion that I didn't say the magic words about purposeful availed itself or something like that. I certainly quoted that standard, and my conclusion was that there was a proper basis for personal jurisdiction under the law as it exists. The motion to reconsider it is denied as is the motion under 1292(b).

I don't think this is a question under which there is

1 reasonable grounds to find some sort of a difference of 2 opinion about what the law is in anything that's material. 3 This whole thing about evidentiary hearings is a matter of 4 unclarity, but that's not really critical to this. The motion 5 to reconsider and to certify and to stay is denied. 6 The answer to the complaint is due in four weeks. 7 That's the 6th of January. 8 We're going to have a status hearing shortly after 9 that to set a schedule all the way through trial because I 10 said I was going to give you a prompt trial date, and so I 11 Ιf want you to talk about a schedule and try to agree on one. 12 you can't, that's fine. Just come in prepared to talk about 13 it. We are going to do the status hearing on the 13th of 14 January at 9:00 in the morning. That will be in chambers. 15 Take care. 16 MR. WOLEK: Thank you, your Honor. 17 MR. GOLLWITZER: Your Honor, is it possible to do the 18 12th of January? 19 THE COURT: Are you okay on the 12th on the defense 20 side? Either one is fine with me. 21 MR. WOLEK: We are okay on the 12th, your Honor. 22 THE COURT: 12th of January at 9:00 o'clock. 23 MR. GOLLWITZER: Thank you, your Honor. 24 (Which were all the proceedings had in the above-entitled 25 cause on the day and date aforesaid.)